

The citizenship debate and youth in European Union

Discussion paper to whom it may concern. Cite free, author unnamed.

“Citizenship is the active membership and participation of individuals in society who are entitled to rights and responsibilities and who have capacity to influence politics. Therefore citizenship has to be more than a political and juridical status; it also is a social role.”

I started by citing Cesar Birzea’s formulation from June 2002 at the 2nd Pilot Course on European Citizenship, organized by the Partnership between the European Commission and the Council of Europe¹. The citation opens up some of the essential features of the complex make-up of the concept of citizenship: rights/responsibilities, capacities to influence politics, social process and memberships. However, the point is not this. What is important here is the context. There have been many activities in Europe around youth and citizenship. European Union has launched an entire field of discourse with the concept of *active citizenship*. Council of Europe has done a lot on this branch, too. It started an ambitious project, *Education for Democratic Citizenship* in 1997. It declared the year 2005 the *European Year of Citizenship*. Council of Europe has long been one of the real actors in the field (education for citizenship; education seen as a gateway to citizenship). Thus a well documented knowledge base as well as a field of sophisticated conceptual discourse exist. There are also established practices to adopt ideas from, if one is eager to think of the dilemma (and to act out) in the youth field². Just take a look at the bibliographies about citizenship, education for democratic citizenship and political participation on the web pages of Council of Europe³.

The above is no news. Obviously there is still much to add to the topic in the youth context, for example, to mention one theme, diversity. That is, there is a need to find and to consider many citizenships instead of only one. There are also transformations taking place in the conditions of citizenship(s). One issue is that young people in Europe do not have any special perception about citizenship at the European level. This is clearly shown in a study by Claire Wallace, Georg Datler and Reingard Spannring (2006)⁴. One can state without exaggeration that only few know what European citizenship means, which can also be seen in the amazingly low turnout in the EU elections. Adults are not doing any better. This displays the fact that the EU does not have a proper resonance with civil societies in the member states. For many reasons it is therefore worth asking: What’s the substance of youth citizenship in the context of the EU? In principle, the answer is a simple one. The EU rhetoric is a funny thing, because while being empty in its official form, it manages to be that in a productive way: One can fill in the ‘hollow’ rhetoric with as deep a discourse he or she is willing to engage in and capable of conducting. The rhetoric gives political space for discussing the issue. Not a bad achievement, or is it?

¹ Under Construction. Citizenship, Youth and Europe. T-kit on European Citizenship. T-Kit No. 7. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing 2003, 20

² In 2006-2008, the Council of Europe priorities of participation will put special emphasis on, first promoting and sustaining the role of youth organisations in the development of democratic participation. To the second promoting citizenship education and participation of and by young people, and to the third promoting access of young people to decision-making.

³ http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-operation/Youth/ <accessed 23.8.2007>

⁴ Young People and European Citizenship (<http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/soc/rs68.pdf>) <accessed 23.8.2007>

Literally speaking, where does the concept of *active citizenship for young people* come from? European Commission White Paper, A New Impetus for European Youth (2001) is the source. When preparing the document, ‘active citizenship’ was said to have emerged from the consultation process of the draft document. The White paper states (page 12)⁵ the following:

“The young people who were consulted see themselves as responsible citizens. They want to be more involved in community life. They want their views to be heard on a wide variety of subjects. This will to participate must be given room for expression at various levels, from local to international; it must take several forms – active and representative – and must not exclude any type of commitment, be it one-off or ongoing, spontaneous or organised. Moreover, this involvement cannot be limited to a single consultation and certainly not to opinion polls. It has to include young people in the decision-making process.”

Here after in the White Paper document ‘participation’ and ‘information’ are discussed as key dimensions for active citizenship. The adjective ‘active’ refers to various abilities and skills – cultural, social and cognitive – essential for the practise of that citizenship⁶. It invites civic education and processes of learning of citizenship to the agenda. Presumably it is also concerned with the dimension of ethos. *Volition* is the term here, opening up the road to classical philosophies of *virtue*.

From the linguistic point of view, it has been argued that the formulation ‘young active citizenships’ is misleading and incorrect as an English expression. The correct formulation would read, it has been claimed, ‘active young citizenships’. The argument in the semantic angle is that the so called central adjectives, such as *active* and *young*, can only be combined in a certain order⁷. This small semantic detail may have a kind of a political meaning as well. Is there a special type or form of citizenship(s) for young people?

Citizenship

Citizenship studies as a new academic field has been under construction during the last few years. Hundreds of books and dozens of articles in humanities and social sciences have been published under the theme⁸. The vast flow of publications signifies the fact that there’s a citizen debate going on. The debate has also other connotations besides the academic. The issue is highly political. As is this text. So, dear citizen reader, be critically aware! Contest all that is said in my paper, don’t hesitate to be political!

In order to get a grip on the matter I will first refer to the *modern Western concept of citizenship*. It was born out of the nation-state in which certain rights and obligations were allocated to individuals under its authority. Usually rights mentioned here include the civil (free speech and movement, the rule of law), the political (voting, elections) and the social (welfare, health care, unemployment insurance). These vary from one state to another but the expectation is that modern democratic state

⁵ . http://ec.europa.eu/youth/whitepaper/download/whitepaper_en.pdf <accessed 23.8.2007>

⁶ . http://ec.europa.eu/youth/whitepaper/download/com_2003_184_en.pdf <accessed 23.8.2007>

⁷ The order of adjectives (non-derived+deverbal+denominal) according to Quirk et.al. Source: email of the translator of Ministry of Education in Finland 28.2.2006.

⁸ A search on Social Sciences Index yielded for Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner more than 1100 articles citing citizenship (see Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner: *Citizen Studies: An Introduction*. In Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 10.)

maintains a combination of citizenship rights and obligations.⁹ Thomas Janoski and Brian Gran formulate the modern concept of citizenship sharply: “(C)itizenship may be defined as passive and active membership of individuals in a nation-state with universalistic rights and obligations at a specified level of equality”.

There are four important points in that definition above. 1. Citizenship begins with determining membership in a nation-state. 2. It involves active capacities to influence politics and passive rights of existence under a legal system. 3. Citizenship rights are universalistic. 4. Citizenship is a statement of equality, with rights and obligations being balanced.¹⁰

When conceptualising citizenship it is conventional to refer to Marshalls’ classical¹¹ distinctions of citizenship. Marshall argued that there are three main dimensions of citizenship: civil, political and social. Marshall’s conception has a canonical Theodore status¹². It has been so influential that the discussion (in Europe) has been about three types of citizen rights (civil, political and social). Marshall’s triad is certainly useful. One can analyse the citizenship of different social categories with the help of his triad. And sometimes one may find out that some categories have only partial citizenship while other categories have full citizenship, for example, the young Russian boys in Joensuu compared to Finnish boys, or the young Moroccan tomato pickers of Spain compared to the Spanish natives¹³. From this perspective it can be asked whether young people have full citizenship comparable to that of adults. If they do, from what age onwards?

Commenting on the Marshall triad, Thomas Janoski and Brian Gran state that *legal or civil rights* are procedural rights. Janoski and Gran claim that legal rights that create law are foundational and underlie other civil rights. Legal rights include personal security rights that protect citizens against illegal imprisonment, torture and death. They are protections against invasions of privacy as well. Legal rights also mean access rights of legal representation. And from a less procedural perspective, legal rights include rights to freedom of conscience (rights to free speech and press, expression of religion) and choice (occupation or profession, multiracial identities and freedoms of sexual expression including marriage). Political rights refer to participation in the public arena. These include citizens’ rights to vote and participate in the political process and they concern organisations and associations. Political rights also include oppositional rights and minority protections, protest and demonstration rights, free access to government information. Social rights have four dimensions. (1) Enabling rights consist of health care, old age pensions, rehabilitation and family or individual counselling. (2) Opportunity rights consist of different forms of education. (3) Redistributive and (4) compensatory rights involve payments for rights deprivation.¹⁴

Even if Marshall’s triad has been a point of reference for the western studies of citizenship, it does not map out all the areas relevant for the issue. It is bound to nation-state. Maurice Roche addresses

⁹ . Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner: *Citizen Studies: An Introduction* in Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 3.

¹⁰ . Janoski, Thomas and Brian Gran: *Political Citizenship: Foundations of Rights*. In Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 13-14.

¹¹ . Marshall, T.H. *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1950.

¹² . See Peter H. Schuck: *Liberal Citizenship*. In Isin, Engin I. and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 131.

¹³ . Following Diane Richardson who has analysed the partial citizenship of lesbians and gay men in the British context. See Richardson, Diane: *Sexuality and Citizenship*. *Sociology* 32(1998)1, 83-100.

¹⁴ . Janoski, Thomas and Brian Gran: *Political Citizenship: Foundations of Rights*. In Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 15-16.

in relation to the global level new normative and structural social contexts and implications of transnational social development. Such topics, as universal social rights, global citizenship and even cosmopolitan citizenship are relevant in this new (compared to Marshall's) world context¹⁵.

It is also clear that the modern (Western) concept of citizenship may no longer be adequate for the contemporary circumstances. The national level and the nation-state are still important levels but the globalisation throws challenges for the modern model in many different ways. As pointed out above, there is the transnational level, too, and it must be taken seriously¹⁶.

Other themes can be added as well. The Council of Europe's T-kit on citizenship¹⁷ elaborates the triad by pointing out four dimensions of citizenship: political, social, cultural and economic. The cultural dimension refers to language competences and common cultural heritage. The economic dimension refers to the relationship between an individual and the labour market (e.g. right to work, minimum subsistence level). The consumer market is also relevant here (consumer rights).

Citizenship is opened into a dynamic battle field. It is not a static triad (by Marshall) but instead includes many political struggles of recognition and redistribution as instances of claim-making. Often the struggles express questions of identity (or identities) and difference (sexual, 'racial', 'ethnic', diasporic, ecological, technological, cosmopolitan) and are articulated as questions of citizenship. In this vein there are many new multidisciplinary approaches exploring the practices and concepts of, for example, sexual citizenship, ecological citizenship, diasporic citizenship, differentiated citizenship, multicultural citizenship, and Aboriginal citizenship, among others¹⁸.

Citizenships

There are many dimensions of citizenship, indeed so many that one is motivated to think of many citizenships as said before in this paper. The point is not to handle problems in plural nationality and dual citizenship (alone) but to pay attention to the contemporary societal situation on which some late or postmodern theorists have claimed that citizenship is dead¹⁹. In the twenty first century, theories of citizenship have expanded from the state-citizen relationship to everything citizens might do to change their circumstances²⁰. Being politically engaged means practicing substantive citizenship. This means that citizenship must also be defined as a social process²¹.

¹⁵ . Roche, Maurice: Social Citizenship: Grounds of Social Change. In Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): Handbook of Citizenship Studies. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 71.

¹⁶ . This means according to Maurice Roche *"adding further to the complexity of our understanding of the structures of contemporary citizenship and also adding further to the societal contexts we need to take into account when analysing social rights."* (Roche, Maurice: Social Citizenship: Grounds of Social Change. In Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): Handbook of Citizenship Studies. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 73.

¹⁷ . Under Construction. Citizenship, Youth and Europe. T-kit on European Citizenship. T-Kit No. 7. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing 2003, 32-36.

¹⁸ . Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner: Citizen Studies: An Introduction in Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): Handbook of Citizenship Studies. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 2.

¹⁹ . Wexler, Philip: Citizenship in the Semiotic Society. In Bryan Turner: Theories of Modernity and Post-Modernity. Newbury Park CA: Sage 1990, 164-175.

²⁰ . Janoski, Thomas and Brian Gran: Political Citizenship: Foundations of Rights. In Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): Handbook of Citizenship Studies. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 42.

²¹ . Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner: Citizen Studies: An Introduction in Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): Handbook of Citizenship Studies. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 5.

Empirically the combination and extent of rights varies from society to society. In this respect, too, it would make more sense to talk about many citizenships instead of a single model of citizenship. Isin and Turner discuss the liberal, corporatist, social democratic states which all rest on their own interpretation of citizenship. They write: “(i)n liberal democracies such as the United States, Switzerland, and Australia the state relies on markets to allocate social rights and emphasizes civil and political rights. In corporatist states such as Austria, France, Germany, and Italy, social rights are accorded a greater role but are not available universally. By contrast, in social democratic states such as Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, social rights are given the highest priority and the state provides universal benefits such as the right to free vocational or higher education. There are, of course, states that do not neatly fit into these types.”²²

The quotation of Isin and Turner opens up a view to the diversity of citizenships. This view is especially present in the context of globalization and the massive migration related to it. The challenges are considerable. As Henry Teune²³ has articulated the prospect: The question for the future of citizenship is whether global citizenship will and can transcend the citizenships defined by the states on the basis of blood and birth or through an act of the state itself. Teune states that this is beginning to happen. *At issue in this question is the prospect of a world with an inclusive global civilization based on diversity*²⁴.

In Teune’s vision there is room for the European Union, too. It stands, according to him, “as a great human project” to test whether “a civic commonality among ethno-culturally different nationalities” can arise. Immigration is the challenge here. Immigration is also one of the most contested and most controversial issues in Europe and in the EU. There are different understandings of citizenship and national identity, there is racism and xenophobia. All this poses a burning question for the European youth sector, too, a burning question about global citizenships, solidarity and world-wide democracy, that is, the global democratic governance. There is much to do as the United Nations World Youth Reports²⁵ shows.

The European youth sector, especially the Council of Europe, has made a considerable effort in the sphere of anti-racist campaigns. A new round of “All Different – All Equal” project is currently under way. This is invaluable work. But will the campaigning suffice if the societal structures and practices are founded on the premise that interpersonal solidarity is built on (stable) cultural similarities? Racism is partly based on this logic.

The globalization process generates multiple Diasporas, which means that the complex relationships between homeland and host societies will occur. The traditional idea of national citizenship alone does not work anymore. As Isin and Turner put it, labour and other migratory movements will produce a variety of interconnected social changes that are associated with multiculturalism in terms of marriage, family structures, pluralism, and multiplicity. Also Isin and Turner want to

²² . Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner: Citizen Studies: An Introduction in Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): Handbook of Citizenship Studies. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 3.

²³ . He is professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania.

²⁴ . Teune, Henry: Citizenship De-territorialized: Global Citizenships.

www.ssc.upenn.edu/polisci/faculty/bios/Pubs/Teune1.doc <accessed 23.8.2007>

²⁵ . Tommi Hoikkala & Juha Mustonen: Overview: Priorities for Global Youth Policies. In World Youth Report 2003. The Global Situation of Young People. New York: United Nations publication 2004, 1-24; David Buckingham & Tommi Hoikkala: The impact of global media on youth culture. In World Youth Report 2005. Young People Today, and in 2015. New York: United Nations publication 2005, 80-109.

discuss the EU in this context by saying that the EU has attempted to address this dilemma “*through changes to citizenship status that as minimum give some recognition to resident workers, for example Turks in Germany, who do not have full citizenship membership but nevertheless have rights by virtue of their presence as social groups*”.²⁶

But how can the problems of those (African) tomato pickers or grape pickers who do not have a passport be solved? Any contemporary analysis of citizenship should be placed within the social context of increasing multiculturalism. As a sole rhetoric global citizenship is doomed to remain sheer verbiage (which is a threat of the concept of citizenship, too, due to inflated usage of the word). There is a need of strong political actions which transcend the link between social rights and national membership which have been seen as essential. One problem in understanding the trans-national concept of citizenship is that citizenship and human rights are often discussed as two separate arenas. The former is associated with the national level and the latter with the international level. In her article “Some reflections on citizenship and anti-racism” Nira Yuval-Davis states²⁷ that human rights discourse and legislation should be more intensively viewed as a specific arena for the development of supra-national citizenship. One concrete example of such mobilization was the email campaign on the European anti-racist mailing lists some time ago. The demand was to establish proper citizenship rights for those residing in the EU without citizenship. Implicitly the demands were based on invoking the human rights. Perhaps demanding such trans-national civic rights could be the project of the younger generation for whom the “global” is everyday life instead of theoretical discourse. The time could be better for this: Controlling immigration is politically much more attractive an agenda than that of the trans-national citizenship and anti-racist European ethos. Spain has begun legalizing the undocumented migrants, but many other countries have not. This solution, among others, will remain an internal decision of a state, according to the strict subsidiary principle.

Civic virtue

Virtue ethics, a sociological strand of cultural theory (Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum)²⁸ cast a critical light on contemporary citizenship. There is a constant discussion about an erosion of citizenship. That erosion is manifested in low participation rates in elections, in people’s distrust of politicians and conventional political institutions, in lack of joint engagement in associations and civic activity/engagement. Often these phenomena are interpreted as expressions of individualisation²⁹ and of the hyper capitalistic entertainment and consumer culture³⁰. The erosion of citizenship is also often connected to the decline of the public sphere³¹, perhaps as echoes of the

²⁶ . Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner: Citizen Studies: An Introduction in Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): Handbook of Citizenship Studies. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 9.

²⁷ . Yuval-Davis, Nira: Some reflections on the questions of citizenship and anti-racism. In Floya Anthias & Cathie Lloyd (eds.): Rethinking anti-racisms. From theory to practice. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, 44-59.

²⁸ . MacIntyre, Alasdair: After virtue. South Bend: University of Notre Dame 1981; Nussbaum, Martha B.: The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001.

²⁹ . Beck, Ulrich & Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim: Individualization. London: Sage 2001.

³⁰ . Stockwell, Michele: Childhood For Sale. DLC Blueprint Magazine, July 23, 2005.
http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=114&subid=144&contentid=253467 <accessed 23.8.2007>

³¹ . Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner: Citizen Studies: An Introduction in Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): Handbook of Citizenship Studies. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 8.

times ‘when all was better’, the times before the restructuring of the public sphere³². Richard Sennett³³ discusses the corrosion of character –how the contemporary job market creates casualized employment. This is a bad foundation for a responsible mood of citizenship, *virtuous citizen*, as are under-employment, early retirement and extremely flexible hours of work. The virtuous citizen as an educated and energetic member of society must have the feeding conditions to emerge. As Isin and Turner³⁴ formulate: “(t)here is therefore an important connection between virtuous citizen and effective and living institutions; this connection is through the dual operation of virtue and obligation. An autonomous citizen will want to be an active and involved participant in community”.

How, then, does such a culture critical contemplation turn into a youth-related question? The answer is, very easily. This is true, especially if a level of empirically empty speculation is allowed. Whether or not this is the case, dear reader, I will speculate. As a resource of my interpretation I will exploit a kind of vulgar-Marxist model of thinking. What people do is reducible to their productive status and their position in the work force.

The sociological discussion on virtue ethics links citizenship to adulthood. A citizen is an adult who takes part in the civic discussion taking place in the public sphere and for the public good. Such an individual is both capable of weighing the arguments and making his or her own. For this reason such an individual is referred to as an enlightened citizen. It is characteristic that in these kinds of classical conceptualizations the mature or full citizen is an adult. Young people are not sovereign members of the community for they are still practising the skills to grant their entrance. It is not enough to have left one’s parents’ home, but one must have achieved the status of an adult. The discussion started by Richard Sennet can be taken to this point exactly. What else are we talking about then, than a situation in life characterized by temporary employment, or “precarity”?

It is argued that a labour system which is based on short-term contracts and temporary employment does not encourage the development of classical virtues of citizenship. I will propose a hypothesis that in the Western world a *new adulthood* has emerged in the shadow of temporary employment. While people get older they do not necessarily mature. Kate Crawford³⁵ has claimed that two thirds of all grown-ups in the West are *failed adults*, if the norms of adulthood are those of the traditional labour societies, such as, *stable and accumulated working careers*, economic autonomy, security and independence. In Finland the list includes making it on your own. In Britain the term of *kidult*³⁶ is used: This grown-up individual reads Harry Potter, sends text messages, has Play Station, collects stuff, plays, and downloads music to iPod³⁷. But he or she quickly grows tired, does not want

³² . Habermas, Jurgen: *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 1989.

³³ . Sennett, Richard: *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*. New York: W.W. Norton 1998.

³⁴ . Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner: *Citizen Studies: An Introduction* in Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 8.

³⁵ . Crawford, Kate: *Adult themes. Rewriting the Rules of Adulthood*. Sydney: Pan Macmillan 2006

³⁶ . Synonyms: Peterpandemonium, kidult, middlescence, see: http://www.phrases.org.uk/bulletin_board/23/messages/7.html <accessed 24.8.2007>. Fran Furedi has another view, see documentation in footnote 38.

³⁷ . Bartholomew, Craig G: *Celebrating Harry Potter*

<http://www.kidultgame.com/en/homepage.htm?http://www.kidultgame.com/en/company/kidult.htm> <accessed 23.8.2007>

commitments and has trouble bearing boring family life. The person is insecure about the future, does not dare to commit or start a family, because he or she does not feel able to take on the role of a supporter of a family. Often this kind of a young adult, fond of playing, is male³⁸. One could observe a similar phenomenon from a female perspective through, for example, the Briget Jones – syndrome³⁹. Of course this story is about middle class, the biggest class in prosperous European Societies.

The theme does invite one to speculate whether the adulthood of thirty-something's is a kind of a sandwich. These young adults are located between the “real” youth of less than twenty years of age and the older generations (baby boom generations and those tagging along) holding the societal power. They do not have power and nobody knows whether they want power in the same way as the politicized youth in the 1970s⁴⁰. The sandwich gang is incapable of creating economy which has made “real adults” of the people of this age before. The life of the “real adults” has included one’s own house, children, stable and accumulating working career, and a serene life. The sandwich adults on the other hand prolong their youth by travelling, consuming, enjoying themselves. However, they also get anxious, feel lonely and suffer from psychophysical symptoms. We also talk of the yo-yo generation who is constantly bumping between work and unemployment. Getting along and succeeding requires more and more individual abilities, communicative skills, flexibility and social capital. Consumerism is central. The performative nature of life, tastes and styles are over-emphasized. Immense pressures form in the face of having to make choices in life, resulting mostly from the abundance and insecurity of options on offer. Alongside the *difficult or problem youth* we see the emergence of *difficult or problematic early adulthood*. The numerous possibilities, directions and choices of life careers escalate into a panic. One has to make the right choices to succeed. Members of the yo-yo gang might even move back into their parents’ home, especially due to some moves in the relationship game. This, too, applies to young men more often than to young women. Youth transitions are nevertheless of an unstable and de-standardized⁴¹ nature for all genders.

It has been known for long that the working careers of young people are often non-linear and non-accumulative. This has relevance for citizenship. Howard Williamson wrote at the end of the 1990s: *The scenario is gloomy one into which to inject arguments concerning citizenship. Young people’s*

³⁸ . Furedi, Frank: The children who won’t grow up. Spiked Essays 29 July 2003. <http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000006DE8D.htm> <accessed 23.8.2007>

³⁹ . Jolma, Chris: 'Miseducation of Women' Author calls Bridget Jones a syndrome. Washington Times, 28 October 2003. http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0199-3252411_ITM <accessed 24.8.2007>

⁴⁰ . Perhaps these generations (in Finland, those born in 1945-1950, and those tagging along born by 1958) really formed the last political generation in a collectivistic sense. The fall of the Berlin Wall would stand as the final point of a political epoch. Jon Beasley-Murray seems to have considered something similar, beginning his article: *To begin this paper with the appropriate apocalyptic tone, I might suggest that in these times of dissipation and decay, this "period of slackening" (Lyotard 71), we have moved decisively beyond the traditional terrain of politics. That grand old narrative of liberation was finally buried with the Berlin Wall which was the last sign of possible alternatives to capitalism.* Politics: 1789-1989 R.I.P. Beasley-Murray, Jon: Ethics as Post-Political Politics. <http://www.art.man.ac.uk/SPANISH/staff/Writings/ethics.html> <accessed 13.6.2006>

⁴¹ . Walther, Andreas: Regimes of youth transitions: choice, flexibility and security in young people’s experiences across different European contexts. Young 14(2006)2, 119-140.

*rights have been steadily eroded over the last two decades. Their 'status' has always been problematic, as they formally achieve a variety of legal rights at different chronological ages. But their social rights have clearly been curtailed, raising questions about their capacity to exercise even their formally conferred legal rights.*⁴²

The lesson seems to be the following. The more socially excluded the youth is, the worse is their participation. Give a proper social position and a good social condition for young people, and they are willing to exercise their formal rights.⁴³ The lesson taught by Williamson's text is a valid statement after ten years after it was written. There is another evidence too from a research seminar organized by Council of Europe⁴⁴. Chapter three in the documentation of the seminar tells about the non-linear transitions of youth into labour market. It is also pointed out that European policies are less than effective because they assume a normal youth transition that would be straightforwardly linear and focused on labour market entry. The linear model does not work; employment and regular work are scarce resources for young people. There are also European countries with collapsed youth labour markets. Research shows that the entries last a long time, longer than the linear model assumes. It is also reported that young people are the most disadvantaged, and that welfare systems are inadequate to meet young people's needs.⁴⁵

A possible interpretation would be that there is a crisis in those transitions. This must have relevance for youth citizenship as well. Eldin Fahmy has looked at social capital/exclusion with relevance for participation. Fahmi discusses General Survey Data from the US context, which emphasises the importance of factors such as educational attainment, income, ethnicity, and marginalisation in shaping patterns of associational involvement. In the UK, the analysis of 2001 General Household Survey data reveals, according to Fahmi, "*attitudinal measures of civic engagement to be significantly correlated with a range of individual-level socio-demographic characteristics. Young people, the economically inactive, private and social renters, those lacking educational qualifications, manual employees and ethnic minorities are amongst those most likely to be disengaged*".⁴⁶

We are talking about a labour system which rarely offers the employee a long-term contract, for example one that would last until retirement. The flexible job market demand employees to be able to work on short-term basis, to be ready to adapt to alterations and sudden changes in the job

⁴² . Williamson, Howard: Youth work and citizenship. In John Bynner – Lynne Chisholm – Andy Furlong (eds.): Youth, Citizenship and Social Change in a European Context. Gateshead: Asgate 1997, 196-213.

⁴³ . Just another citation from Williamson: "(...) *participation and responsibility would necessarily have to be enshrined within a framework of social obligation to citizens, including: access to resources including information, a right to purposeful activity (if not employment per se), and a right to sufficient social protection. Only within this framework can all citizens be expected to take a full place within civil society. It is a framework based on a sense of reciprocity, mutuality and contract, rooted in the assertion that civil society is fundamentally social, with individuals firmly embedded within its web (...)*." See: Williamson, Howard: Youth work and citizenship. In John Bynner – Lynne Chisholm – Andy Furlong (eds.): Youth, Citizenship and Social Change in a European Context. Gateshead: Asgate 1997, 208.

⁴⁴ . *Social Exclusion and Young People, Research seminar* 31 October – 2 November 2005, Council of Europe & European Commission Youth Research Partnership.

⁴⁵ . Colley, Helen, Bryony Hoskins, Teodora Parveva, Philipp Boezelen: *Social Exclusion and Young People*, Research seminar 31 October – 2 November 2005, Council of Europe & European Commission Youth Research Partnership. 2003, 13. <http://documents.youth-knowledge.net/documents/480.pdf> <accessed 24.8.2007>

⁴⁶ . Fahmi, Eldin: *Social Capital, Social Exclusion & Political Participation in Britain*. Findings from the 1999 Poverty & Social Exclusion Survey. Citizenship and Attitudes to Governance In Britain: Project Working Paper 1. http://www.bris.ac.uk/sps/ESRC-ODPM/WP1_pse.pdf <accessed 24.8.2007>

description. Adulthood in the traditional sense, being built on stability, serenity and a level of calming down, cannot properly develop on the foundation which is all about flexibility and changes.

Is it possible to conclude that precarity inflates adulthood, because it prevents the construction of the culture and ethos of commitment? And is it plausible to interpret that the phenomenon of precarity serves to build the moral of *now*? Companies are bought and sold; competitive bidding leads to operations being moved from one subcontractor to another, from one country to another. Committing to one company is difficult. The logic of transience in the labour market threatens the personality structure of people. This was the thesis of Richard Sennet, introduced above. Put as a question: How do today's practices of socialization manage to transmit the moral models of responsibility, loyalty and holding on to one's goals to the youth, when the ideology of flexibilisation and mistrust are gaining ground in working life? Even if one is employed for a period of time, it is advisable to remain an outsider, keeping doors open to other possibilities and committing only to extent that is necessary.

From this we can make a conclusion which touches upon the agenda of the EU youth policy. The White Paper and the definitions of policy adopted in its production focus too much on the themes of participation and one dimension of citizenship civil society, civic action/civic engagement. It is problematic if such a focus is taken at the expense of the social and economic dimensions of citizenship. This observation may not be new or original. The report of the Social Exclusion and Young People research, mentioned above, is concerned with similar issues:

For young people today, finding employment or regular work with decent contracts and an average wage is on one of their greatest difficulties. However, until now the youth sector has focused on political participation and youth as actors of social change, for example, their involvement in associative life, NGOs, and development of democracy. The change of emphasis is in this seminar and the change of emphasis within the European Commission as a whole within the Lisbon strategy towards 'Growth and Jobs' is welcomed, however, the importance of civil society should not be forgotten or ignored. This panel focused on bringing back into balance the importance of civil society and the need for active citizens in order to facilitate the continuation of democracy, uphold human rights, equality and safeguard the environment. The panel emphasized the need for a concerted effort by all levels: local national and European and by all stakeholder: NGO:s, practioners, researchers and policymakers to work together to make this possible⁴⁷.

The quotation includes valid points but does the last sentence [(t)his panel focused (...)] take away from the sharp argumentation of the first part? In my mind it does. A true change of emphasis should be seeked instead of a rhetoric shift in the reality of documents.

Compared to previous documents, the European Youth Pact for young people, discussed by the European Council⁴⁸, also includes a shift towards a more comprehensive treatment of the situation of the youth. The priorities of the White Paper, participation and information, are accompanied by themes which are related to the everyday life of the youth, at least on paper. The themes include, for example, addressing challenges in the fields of employment, integration and social advancement; education, training and mobility; reconciliation of working and family life.

⁴⁷ . Colley, Helen, Bryony Hoskins, Teodora Parveva, Philipp Boezelen: Social Exclusion and Young People, Research seminar 31 October – 2 November 2005, Council of Europe & European Commission Youth Research Partnership. 2005, 23-24. <http://documents.youth-knowledge.net/documents/480.pdf> <accessed 24.8.2007>

⁴⁸ . Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (22 and 23 March 2005) http://europa.eu/youth/news/index_1794_en.html <accessed 24.8.2007>

The present author, however, has difficulties understanding the meaning and effectiveness of such documents and statements on the level of everyday life. The Lisbon strategy⁴⁹ striving to realise its ambition to become the most competitive and knowledge-based economy in the world does not strike the author of the present work as exemplary of the European Social Model. Instead it appears to be a case of economic efficiency and the market model, and the management thinking with its administrative techniques as a feature of the latter, being reached to new areas and operations. Here we are dealing with a vision of how the economy and the society of the EU states were supposed to be developed in the ten year period, a vision of the then-leaders of the member states. The Lisbon Strategy has been perceived as an attempt to bring the economic and social dimensions of the EU politics together in a new way. There was also a initiative to make social policy a central part of the European economic thinking and structural reform program. Due to the decisions made in Lisbon, the social policy of the Union was steered away from a strict division of authority and jurisdiction, towards the guidance of Eurosummits and the Commission⁵⁰.

In any case, anything that serves to strengthen the functionality of the European Social Model⁵¹ and to consolidate the dimension of social citizenship is to be seen as positive. This is politicizing, dear reader, bear with me. Please, disagree with me if you don't share my opinions on the importance of the social citizenship within the discourse on the EU and its youth policy.

Civic action/engagement - participation

Diversity as a point of view (cf. the thought of many citizenships instead of one citizenship) can be useful for observing the themes of young people's political action, too. The view is controversial in an interesting way. The conventional political institutions of representative democracy do not seem to inspire the youth to take action. Results in the EUYOUNGART –project⁵² of eight European countries tell that the majority of the interviewed youth is not very interested in politics (37% interested vs. 63% disinterested in total). The most interested youth live in Germany with 51%, whereas young people in the UK (30%), Estonia (29%) and Slovakia (28%) are least interested. Italy comes second with 43% closely followed by Austria with 42%, and France and Finland rank next with 36% and 35% respectively. And further: the European youth shows little trust in political parties, many feel close to a certain party. NGOs seem most trustworthy to the youth. In all eight countries participating in this study, the young people said that it is NGOs like Greenpeace or Amnesty International that they trust most. Perhaps surprisingly the European institutions (i.e. the

⁴⁹ European Council, March 2000

⁵⁰ The analysis network of European social policy. <http://www.stakes.info/euso/Lissabon.htm> <accessed 14.6.2006>

⁵¹ The model has not worked well in the 21st century. I quote JP Roos, Professor of Social Politics wrote in his speech, which was never given at 4th Annual Conference of Finnish Youth Research Society "*Young Citizens, Professional Power and Responsibility of Youth Research*" held in Gustavelund, Tuusula, November 2.-4th.2005 as follows: "According to the so-called constitution for Europe, now rendered inoperative, there is a European Social model. Only it is not very concrete and its actual appearance there are some stipulations concerning solidarity and there is a stipulation saying that in areas of public services, security of employment and collective bargaining, competition must take second place. The European social model also encompasses the social cohesion principle: the poorer regions of Europe will get support from the wealthier regions. (see Alain Supiot: *Refeudalising Europe* London Review of Books 21 July 2005). Alan Supiot was Chair of the European Commission's rather recent *Supiot Report on Employment Law and the Transformation of Work* (2000).

⁵² . www.sora.at is telling: The aim of EUYOUNGART was to develop a high-quality instrument for the comparative measurement of political participation of young people (aged 15-25 years) in Europe. The measurement instrument developed is a model questionnaire which builds up on the strengths and weaknesses of existing empirical studies on youth and politics. The model questionnaire has been put into practice in interviews with 8.030 Europeans between the age of 15 and 25.

European Parliament and the EU-Commission) enjoy more trust than the national institutions in the respective countries.⁵³

It is a European trend that young people are lazy voters. On the web site of Council of Europe it is squarely stated: *There exists today a growing feeling among young people that the representative political institutions are out of touch with their realities. These institutions are not perceived as being fully representative or accessible. (...) One reaction is to disengage oneself from participating in the political democratic processes, a reaction, which can vary from half-hearted, sporadic commitment at election time to outright political apathy.*⁵⁴

Typically in the scientific debate on the topic such a trend, a disengagement from traditional forms of political participation, is noted. It is also typical to see, alongside this trend, a growing flora and fauna of the gamut of young people's own, new politics, its diversity. The gamut can be gathered under the umbrella concept, or heading, of *new patterns of civic action*. The diversity is further emphasized by the various participation projects and influencing structures designed to activate young people and organized by youth services, organizations and associations, which may or may not be receiving funding from the EU. Youth organizations have a central role here, filling an clear position as part of the practice of open coordination (EU's form of knowledge management). Youth research is also part of the same structure. Youth research is seen as producing information which is then given as evidence to form a basis for political decisions and good administrative practices. But research can also stimulate discussion and also act as catalysts. Perhaps it can also legitimize and have a governing function. If the diversity of young people's activities can be seen as new forms of civic action, the latter (youth organizations and research as two actors of three in the open method of coordination) can be seen as actors of management (cf. *new public management*). Indeed the relation civic engagement – governance is an important topic to be discussed here.

The real question is, will the new patterns of civic action, and their linkage to the new administrative practices in some mysterious way, replace the traditional forms of political participation? The same applies to functions for society and individual as part of social tissue. Siyka Kovacheva⁵⁵ asks: “(i)s this a trend toward a lasting youth disengagement from politics and society?” and answers herself: “(r)esearch-based evidence of youth's non-involvement in politics is controversial and its evaluations debatable”. The research has been too fragmented and partial; there are methodological problems; the truly comparative projects of various countries are rare exceptions; and thus proper longitudinal data series are conspicuous by their absence. So claims Kovacheva. This can be commented on: Perhaps the question is what is considered politics and what is seen as rather defining politics and political activities. It is justifiable to be concerned about the “electoral citizenship” of the youth, in other words their lack of interest in the elections⁵⁶, but the state of affairs does not tell the whole truth about the young people's relationship to politics.

⁵³ . <http://www.sora.at/de/start.asp?b=236> <accessed 24.8.2007>

⁵⁴ . http://www.coe.int/t/e/cultural_co%2Doperation/youth/2_Priorities/participation.asp#TopOfPage <accessed 24.8.2007>

⁵⁵ Kovacheva, Siyka: Will youth rejuvenate the patterns of political participation? In Joerg Forbrig (ed.): Revisiting youth political participation. Challenges for research and democratic practice in Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2005, 19.

⁵⁶ In Finland in 1979 the turnout of the young people in the parliamentary elections was 75%, in 1999 53%, in 2003 54%. In the municipal elections of 2000 in Helsinki (under 28-year-olds) the turnout was 41%, in 2004 elections 46%. Lasse Siurala claims this is the European tendency (Siurala, Lasse: Kymmenen kysymystä nuortenpoliittisesta osallistumisesta. Nuorisotyö 3/2004, 18.)

Alongside the decreasing turnouts of elections we have witnessed many ups and downs in the civic activities, activisms, networks and movements of young people. In Europe unexpected, large-scale mass demonstrations can flare up. In November 2001 Spanish students got organized to demonstrate against the government's university legislation. Seattle 1999, sparked off a series of globalization critical demonstrations some of which took place in Europe. Until 9/11 this wave of protest attracted an ever increasing number of participants. Then it dried up. The next condensation was linked to anti-war sentiments in the context of Iraq. In November 2002 the oil tanker Prestige sank near the Galician coast and repairing the damages was left to civic movements and organizations. The national incidents and demonstrations of young people have a tendency to break news globally: 'Riots in France' (CNN, Nov 2005) and the French students' protest against youth labour laws, in April 2006. In Barcelona, in the spring 2006, young people demonstrated against the age limits and high serving prices of restaurants. The 1st of May events of the EuroMayDay⁵⁷ network of Berlin and Stockholm were exceptionally big. In Helsinki the similar event led to a societal discussion about the young generation's conditions, the phenomenon of precarity, and the guaranteed minimum income.

How can we evaluate these? Some people would consider at least some of the events listed above as hooliganism. Others may consider them signs of quickly changing protest phenomena of the post-modern and global media-driven world, which the conventional and institutionalized political theory fails to understand. Finnish Youth Cooperation Allianssi made a statement (10 May, 2006) on the events of the 1st of May in Helsinki. Allianssi *"considers the events which took place around the old railway buildings of VR and in the demonstrations regrettable. Because of the event, a marginalized group of young people ended up branding and labelling the Finnish youth more generally. This was especially harmful for those socially active young people who dare to express their views by legal means. The events do not, however, reflect the general condition of the youth, even though it does indicate in its own context that problems exist. The matter is serious, but the reactions should be reasonable considering the extent of the incident. It is also important to make sure the authorities, decision-makers or the media won't overreact to the events"*⁵⁸.

Allianssi would appear to consider the new forms of street participation, which may be quite rough compared to what we have seen in Finland before, to threaten the legitimacy and the scope for action of the representative democracy.

Some Finnish youth researchers interpret the above mentioned demonstrations as signs, signals, and symptoms of the general situation of young people in contemporary Europe. In this area we have a wealth of wonderful concepts to guide us. The classical concepts of social movements ("movement", "phases", "moments of madness" and "falling in love") are now accompanied by "networks", "protest waves", "accumulation of waves", "projects", "amoebas", "pieces", "fragments" and "stylizing the identity". The only thing missing now is a ("youthful") youth sociologist who would (desperately, in media, of course) try to make sense of the demonstrations with a metaphor of, say, *a blinking LED light*. Young people's new projects and actions catch fire and die out in the new urban political space, characterized by a lack of centre, from the Internet to the streets and squares, at a pace inconceivable for adults and those with such a frame of mind.

Seriously speaking, underlying the current situation is the difference in the generation movements. In Europe of the 1960s, 70s and 80s, the social movements of young people were funnelled into party formations in one way or another. The organizational commitments of the contemporary

⁵⁷ The carnevalistic Labour Day demonstrations of twenty European cities. <http://www.chainworkers.org/?q=node/178> <accessed 24.8.2007>

⁵⁸ . http://www.alli.fi/sivu.php?artikkeli_id=1714 <accessed 16.6.2006>

portfolio generation have a much more individualistic nature, and acting together means a different thing in the 21st century than it did in the 1970s. The forms of communality and the communal tissue offered to the members of today's societies are in many ways completely different from those of the societies of the 1970s. This is evident from the views contemporary youth hold of politics. Robert Putnam's summary dealing with the USA does not, however, apply to Europe without modifications. Putnam says⁵⁹ that social trust and civic engagement have declined significantly in the United States in the end of the twentieth century. Pippa Norris⁶⁰ makes perhaps a more adequate statement when she "*argues that political participation has undergone a significant transformation – from the involvement of interest groups to new social movements, from conventional repertoires to protest politics, and from state orientation to a multiplicity of target agencies, both non-profit and private*", as formulated by Siyka Kovacheva⁶¹.

Internet is one of the new forums of the politics of the youth. Young people are the driving force behind this digital tissue. Internet petitions are a popular way of expressing an opinion in public today. A hilarious example from Finland: The fans of the Eurovision winner 2006 Lordi got furious when a gossip magazine *Seitsemän päivää* ("Seven days", owned by the Danish publishing house Aller) published a picture of the singer, Tomi Putaansuu, without his mask in the front cover of the magazine. The magazine did it to lift the sales and circulation, even though the singer had pleaded to the media not to publish pictures of him without the mask. In three days the Internet petition for boycotting the *Seitsemän päivää* magazine had 200, 000 signatures. Many of the advertisers of the magazine also got alarmed and joined the outraged people. The magazine soon agreed to apologize⁶². This is a perfect example of the operational logic of digital democracy, an expression of *late modern civic virtue*. Digital democracy operates on the EU level, too. www.oneseat.net had collected over one million signatures (until September 2006) in the internet petition demanding that the European Parliament would be in session in only one city, Brussels. The savings would rise up to 200 million if the logistic rally between Strasbourg and Brussels were reorganized.

Perhaps it is not sensible to contrast the different forms of the political activities of young people, the old school voting citizenship and the new demonstrativeness, not to mention the conventional social activities of young people. The last can be called the *Allianssi* segment in Finland (cf. the declaration of Allianssi above: *socially active young people who dare to express their views by legal means*) and the Youth Forum segment in Europe. The same applies to all inventive Participation projects, numerous in Europe, in which the civic virtue is placed in ingenious ways to form the basis of the mentality of the youth.

All in all it can be stated (or can it?) that the low estimation of political parties amid young people is a problem for representational democracy, creating a gap between the political elite and the youth. The legitimacy of the entire system is in jeopardy as a result of the realization of such a gap. Or what is the meaning of the gap?

⁵⁹ Putnam, Robert: *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster 2000.

⁶⁰ Norris, Pippa: *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press)

⁶¹ Kovacheva, Siyka: Will youth rejuvenate the patterns of political participation? In Joerg Forbrig (ed.): *Revisiting youth political participation. Challenges for research and democratic practice in Europe*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2005, 19.

⁶² Rantanen, Miska: Digidemokratian uudet tuulet. Nettiaadresseilla vaaditaan lisää sairaanhoitajia ja kantapaloja pois leipäpusseista. Helsingin Sanomat 18.6.2006, D3

Eschewing party politics is not a youth related phenomenon as such. Politics in the media societies of the 21st century global Europe is not equal to the politics of, say, forty years ago. Parties operate differently today. If the Finnish path of development is true, it can be described by the following gross generalization. Before societies became medialized, the purpose of the party institution was to mediate the thoughts and interests of the class-based groups of people to the institutions of political decision-making. Parties functioned as pumps between the various communities of the civil society and the political establishment. Nowadays parties have shrunk into functioning mainly as election machinery and the mediating function has disappeared. The society has become fragmented, atomized, and the modes of operation of the communities have changed⁶³. EU has brought with it a transnational level, causing the scopes of the national parliaments to diminish⁶⁴. Parties can no longer rely on civic debates of communities, and vice versa, citizens can no longer rely on the parties. Even the dynamics of the civic debates have changed due to the entertainment trend in journalism, and the Internet. We are dealing with a new structure of publicity in which central to the parties are the politics of image and gaining visibility in the various PR forums, including the Internet. No modern party can succeed in elections without a professional marketing strategy, in other words the branding of the ideology and the party line. Contact with the voters is established mainly on the media forums, which highlights the significance of the information and discussion channels of wide circulation. These processes also transform contents; politics become entertainment; postmodern emotional cultures, stirs, scandals and fanaticism rise to define the agendas of politics. Politics, and especially the politicians, are constructed in the light media (in Finland, for example the tabloid papers) to be part of popular culture. Thus the political citizenship and consumer citizenship are mixed in an interesting hybrid. In the traditional bourgeois publicity, to which the civic virtue was linked, politics represented their own sphere outside entertainment.

Parties and the political system around them could perhaps interest the young media consumers (should we use the term media citizens?) if and when the party politics are phenomena of popular culture. If elections include interpersonal drama and allure which fit in the tabloids, the elections are of interest to young people. Politics as such is a theme which is reasonably interesting to the youth.

Besides, the voting citizenship can function in the same manner as the LED light metaphor mentioned above. In a suitable societal and cultural constellation even the voting habits of the youth can brighten up. In Finland the turnout of the presidential elections is much higher compared to other elections. There are also strong arguments for the lowering of the voting age to sixteen. In Finland such an initiative is under way for the municipal elections⁶⁵, but why cannot this discussion be extended to national elections, too?

The changes of the political field, roughly sketched above, are obviously realized in the various national versions. The traditions of publicity vary, and so do the traditions of political activity⁶⁶.

The point

⁶³ Delanty, Gerard: Communitarianism and Citizenship. In Isin, Engin I and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): Handbook of Citizenship Studies. Wiltshire: Sage 2002, 159-174.

⁶⁴ Here the problem of the EU is its weak resonance with the civil society Professor Peter A. Kraus (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin/Goethe Universität Frankfurt) discussed at 4th Annual Conference of Finnish Youth Research Society "*Young Citizens, Professional Power and Responsibility of Youth Research*" held in Gustavelund, Tuusula, November 2.-4th.2005 about the "current crisis of the EU" by stating that the crisis is two fold: "crisis of political representation" and "crisis of political identity".

⁶⁵ Sofia Laine "Saksassa demokratiaa vahvistetaan äänioikeusikärajaa laskemalla" *Nuorisotyö* 5/2005, 22-23.

⁶⁶ Kari Paakkunainen: Nuorten poliittinen osallistuminen kahdeksassa Euroopan Unionin maassa (EUYOUPART). Kansallisten empiiristen tulosten vertailua ja tulkintaa. Unpublished manuscript 2006.

The point is to discover all the forms of active young citizenships. Even though the reader has been worn down with dozens of citizenships, I would like to add one still. That is, the *consumer citizenship* which is expressed in the everyday life of people, in the daily consumer decisions. By highlighting it here, it is not meant that consumer citizenship would substitute, for example, the social citizenship⁶⁷. Consumer citizenship is connected to the themes of ethical consuming and sustainable development. People are commenting on the global economic organization and the bad practices of sweat shops with their choices as consumers. In the European wealthy societies (of the winners of globalization) the consumer citizenship means, for example, the consumers' choices taking place in the every day contexts. Even the most fixed behaviourist politologist should be able to see that politics are present when young people boycott such and such product of an unethical chain of production. The political nature of eating is obvious. Just call it life politics⁶⁸. It is almost a cliché to mention Fair Trade in this context, but one cannot leave it out either. On the markets an entire line of product families of ethically produced goods have emerged which especially young people favour. There are ecological bags and clothes, and discussion can be raised even on ethical jeans or fair travel (voluntary travel tax).

Of course it is possible to doubt the political nature of consuming. The world cannot be saved by buying alone. We need institutions, economic policies and contracts between states. We are talking about boring negotiations, boring politics, boring "meeting citizenship". Boring but indispensable, if we want make changes to the structures. Youth organizations hold a central role here, because they socialize the young decision makers. Still, the theme of influencing through buying is of burning importance because of its connection to the sustainable development. It is important also because through this point of view we can make a link between consuming and citizenship, in other words we can see that the every day choices have their ethics and every one of us has a responsibility for the consequences of excessive consuming.

The theme can also lead one to think of the untenable nature of the contemporary development. At the same time, I connect the consumer citizenship to global citizenship. State of the World 2006 report⁶⁹ illustrates the contemporary landscape in which India and China are beginning to be global major powers, with a growing, consuming middle-class. These middle-classes resemble their Western counterparts and the equation is impossible. The limits of growth will be met. The state of affairs inspires the interesting question of who exactly has the right to the exuberant Western style

⁶⁷ Critical Theory Institute: Futures of Property&Personhood. Here the concern is of the national identity becoming a question of buying things. The critical perspective is as follows: *In much of the world today, social citizenship is no longer a central goal of the state. In rolling back the contract between state, capital, and labour, abandoning social welfare policies to private and voluntary enterprises, and replacing social citizenship with consumer citizenship, the state seems uninterested in its traditional civic obligations. Who "belongs" in a world of consumer citizenship where one participates in the nation by virtue of one's investment in the national productive-consumptive product? What are the boundaries of rights and obligations, given the extensive commodification of citizen identity? And, what are the limits of protest, given the commodification of dissent and the sale of a politics of lifestyle choice or gut-level preference?*

<http://www.humanities.uci.edu/critical/html/Projects%20+%20Events/Futures%20Full/FuturesFullcitznshp.html>
<accessed 24.8.2007>

⁶⁸ A term borrowed from Anthony Giddens, He does not discuss consumer citizenship in his book from 1991 where the term life politics was presented but it can be re-contextualised! See Giddens, Anthony: *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cornwall: Polity Press. 1991.

⁶⁹ Worldwatch Institute: *State of the World 2006: Special Focus: China and India*.
<http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3866> <accessed 24.8.2007>

society. How can we, in Europe, say the child of a Chinese peasant is not entitled to a refrigerator, entertainment electronics and a car? The development of the Northern areas cannot be made general, for such affluence is a sheer impossibility on the global level. What else can this mean but a fairer global distribution of the resources? One answer might be: We must discuss the role of the United Nations as an instrument of global governance.

Conclusion

In this paper I have looked at a series of concepts related to the theme of young active citizenships. The aim was to achieve some conceptual clarification for the discourse space of “citizenship” which is at its best and at its worst like a Finnish lake without shores. The starting point was the crystallized tradition of education for citizenship of the European Council. The view provided by the citizenship studies of the academic field was adjusted to certain results of the European youth research and a suggestion for a change of focus was elicited: The participation focus of the White Paper (cf. political citizenship) should be spiced up with the themes of social and economic citizenship in the youth questions as well. The author of the present paper does not, however, claim to have reinvented the wheel, but instead humbly admits that the theme of social citizenship is a topic which was already present in Youth Pact⁷⁰.

One major theme of the present paper was diversity. Diversity was also sought with the plural form of “citizenship”. With the use of plural, the intention was to give a perspective on the challenges of globalization, as far as they concern citizenship and cause the dimensions of citizenship to multiply. The diversity was sought by contemplating the variety of young people’s civic activities, and the borders and intersections between the new politics of the youth and the traditional voting citizenship. The discussion functioned as a bridge to the themes of consumer citizenship. The central idea of the text was to evoke the themes of classic civic virtue which needs stylizing to fit into the landscape of today’s popular and entertainment culture. Thus the concepts of media citizenship and *late modern civic virtue* are considered with enthusiasm in the text. The precise content of the new civic virtue is not yet known but it strikes me as a good idea.

What did we learn from this pile of concepts? Perhaps that citizenship/s in the youth perspective raise the questions of sovereignty and the conditions of full membership. Can a member of a community be sovereign if his or her position is secondary? The position of young people in the European societies is secondary and precarious. The situation obviously varies from society to society. It is not enough that the youth is socialized as actors, raised to hold the postmodern European civic virtue and they are offered the framework of participation. Young people need space, a place and a proper social status and the corresponding rights (supranational citizenship).

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http://eu2006.bmsg.gv.at/cms/eu2006EN/attachments/6/4/0/CH0606/CMS1136466332233/declaration_of_the_austria_youth_event_2006.pdf <accessed 24.8.2007>